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Abstract 
The relationship between supply factor and firm’s capital structure: a US study 
By 
Yijia Zhang 
September 4, 2013 
The past work which has studied the impact of the factors of the firm’s capital 
structure has always focused on the demand side. That is to maximize the firm’s 
value through different capital structures, industries’ bankruptcy costs and the tax 
shield. Several theories have been developed through these efforts, such as Trade-off 
and Pecking Order Theories.  
 
Since the financial crisis in the second half of 2007, issues over the supply of credit  
have gained attention, so increasingly scholars are now taking supply factors such as 
the impact of access to public bond markets into account. In this way, this paper will 
discuss the relationship between the supply factors and firms’ capital structure. 
Keywords: Supply Factor, Credit Rating, Pecking Order Theory, Trade-off Theory 
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Past academic literature has supported the demand side of the capital structure 
decision. In 1958, Modigliani and Miller (MM) were the first in this area. They made 
several assumptions, such as there were no taxes, agency costs, bankruptcy costs and 
no information asymmetry, to prove that the capital market was efficient. 
Subsequently the original model was modified to consider corporate tax and private 
income tax. Since that time the Trade-off and Pecking Order theories were developed 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) to show that when a firm chooses its capital structure, 
the internal capital is the most preferred because of its cost. 
 
As mentioned in the outset of the chapter, the supply factor such as the credit rating 
and the access of public bond market, need to be taken into account. Faulkender and 
Peterson (2006) found that the firms with access to the public bond market will have 
35% more debt.  
 
Then as Sufi (2006) researched in 2006 “the introduction of bank loan ratings leads 
to an increase in the use of debt by firms that obtain a rating, and in increases in 
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firms' asset growth, cash acquisitions, and investment in working capital”.  
 
Therefore, as one important supply factor, the degree of access to the public debt 
market should also be taken into account of when accounting for firms’ practices in 
the real world. 
 
1.2 Need for the study 
 
What this paper intends to do is to test whether these two theories will work or not 
when we consider supply factors. In order to achieve this research objective, we need 
to apply three models to perform the test and three hypotheses will be made. The 
model which was produced by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) will be the first to be 
used to test whether the firms that have access to public debt markets have a positive 
impact on the firms’ financial leverage or not. 
Q observed = γd X demand factor +γs X supply factor + μ 
             = γd X demand factor +γs Bond market access+ μ           ……1.1 
The second model is that of Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s (1999) and it will be used to 
test the effects of these two theories in the US market.  
ΔLmn =β0 +β1 (L*mn — Lmn-1) +μmn                                    ……1.2 
where L*it is the target debt level for firm m at time n. We take β1, the 
target-adjustment coefficient, as a sample-wide constant. The hypothesis to be tested 





The last model will be regression analysis to test these two theories and how they 





The literature of previous studies has been dominated by the US market as the 
financial environment is the most stable and the largest market in the world.  In this 
vein, this paper will also use the U.S. data for listed companies. The data sample 












Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 M&M Theory 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) developed a proposition that has a seminal effect on 
the finance literature. They argued that under the assumption of a perfect market the 
value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. However, the assumption of 
the perfect market is impossible in real life, and in fact the cost of debt is less than 
the cost of equity. In this way the second proposition is derived from the first 
proposition, which describe that the yield on common stock and financial structure 
are linearly related. The last proposition is that in the firm there is a fixed cut-off 
point that is unaffected by the capital structure.  
 
While this theory is very elegant, in the real world with the presence of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and costs, to provide a meaningful approach to studying capital 
structure, the inclusion of market imperfections is necessary. 
 
 2.2 Trade-off Theory 
 
With the inclusion of the tax element, Modigliani and Miller (1963) adjusted their 
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first proposition of the M&M Theory to take account of it. The conclusion they now 
offered was that the levered firm would have a higher value than an unlevered firm 
because of the tax deductible of the interest cost. In this way, a firm should finance 
totally by debt. However, this is still unrealizable in real life since we cannot using 
debt infinitely without considering the costs of financial distress. That is to say, when 
the debt ratio increases, the related cost of using debt will rise as well. What is more, 
from the Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) study, we can conclude that when a firm’s 
tax benefit is fully covered, the firm’s value will reach its maximum. 
 
The M&M Theory was further expanded by other researchers, such as Jensen (1986), 
who takes the free cash flow factor into account.  His theory implies that managers of 
firms with large free cash flows may have a preference to take part in mergers. This 
behavior exacerbates or may even destroy the commonality of interest between 
shareholders and managers. In addition, the firm with poor management will do 
worse when compared it with the performance prior to a merger. In this way, debt 
cannot be infinitely borrowed.  
 
Other risks can also be caused by large amounts of debt. From the Myers (1977) 
study, the firms may abandon the higher profit projects when the debt is higher than 
the normal level. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) study indicate that the 
cost of debt is not a constant proportion of the amount of debt, as the service cost 





The leverage ratio has been proved to affect the firms operation. Firstly, some 
relationships have been found and proved. Bradley and Kim (1984) proved that the 
debt amount and the expected costs of financial distress are negatively correlated 
while Mackie-Mason (1990) found out that the leverage and tax shield are positively 
correlated.  Moreover, Miller and Modigliani (1966) offered the result that the debt 
ratio and interest tax shield have a positive relationship. That is to say the firms 
always want to borrow more in order to gain more shield.  
 
Bradley and Kim. (1984) showed that the optimal firm leverage is related inversely 
to expected costs of financial distress and to the (exogenously set) amount of 
non-debt tax shields. Smith and Watts (1992) find a negative relationship between 
the growth opportunities and the debt level. Then, the researchers made the 
conclusion that the capital structure has a direct impact on firms’ management or 
directly affected by the management.  
 
Long and Malitz (1985) got the conclusion that a major factor which influences 
corporate leverage decisions is the type of investments a firm undertakes. 
Hovakimian et al (2001) agreed that firms often make financing and repurchase 
decisions that offset those earnings-driven changes in their capital structures and 
stock prices play an important role in determining a firm's financing choice. Rajan 
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and Zingales (1995) find that the correlation between profitability and capital 
structure will be reduced if the investment opportunity is related with profitability. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) contend that determinants of capital structure change with 
respect to each measure of debt used. 
 
After the firm considers every situation and to achieve the ideal debt amount, it will 
use historic data of the debt to equity ratio, and make adjustments to reach the ideal 
debt. That is to say for the firms whose leverage is below the ideal level, it will 
increase it and the firms which leverage higher than the ideal level, it will decrease it. 
However, it is impossible for a firm to keep a constant level by value of fluctuating 
stock prices or cash flows. In this way, the dynamic trade-off theory was developed 
by Fischer et al (1989). In this theory the firms’ debt ratio can be move in a range 
which can be accepted by the firms, but the debt ratio needs to move over time to the 
ideal level. 
 
2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
 
From the view of the Trade-off Theory, high profitability has a positive relationship 
with the leverage ratio, since the firm with high profitability is not contrained by the 
bankruptcy cost and has the benefit of the tax shield. However, it cannot be denied 
that there is something, such as information asymmetry and the existence of 
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transaction costs, that are taken into consideration in the Trade-off Theory.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) comment that the Trade-off Theory does not explain firms' 
financing behavior. They derive this conclusion that the modified Pecking Order 
Theory recognizes both asymmetric information and the costs of financial distress. 
These two costs will rise when the firm climbs up the pecking order. The high 
possibility of financial distress costs and also of future positive-NPV projects may be 
given up since the firm may not like to finance them by issuing common stock or 
other risky securities. The firm can reduce these costs by issuing stock now, even it is 
not immediately needed, in order to move the firm down the pecking order. In other 
words, a flexible financial situation is valuable and the firm may rationally issue 
stock to acquire it.  
 
In order to avoid this asymmetric information problem, the firm can finance by 
internal funds instead of external funds. Based on the above explanatory, Myers 
(1984) got the idea that in the longer term, financial intermediaries may be less 
central to the development of firms, but in the early stages of the growth of firms and 
economies, an efficient banking system may be an essential requirement for 
expansion. What is more, a level of preferred capital structure is to use internal funds, 
then followed by external debt, and then external equity. 
 
Besides information asymmetry, the above condition can also be explained by 
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transaction costs. Donaldson (1961) considered that processing of financing behavior 
by firms can also be affected by transaction costs. That is retained earnings can be 
used first because they can be used without transaction fees. Then, debt is prior to 
securities because the transaction fee is lower (Baskin, 1989). In this way equity has 
always been abandoned when debt is available. Only when a firm cannot use debt to 
finance, at that point equity can be chosen. This can also be used to explain the 
negative relationship between a firm’s profitability and debt ratio. 
 
However, Fama and French (2005) do not agree with the above opinion that the costs 
of issuing equity are high. They comment that transaction costs and asymmetric 
information problems may not seriously restrict equity issues. In this case, equity 
issues are not the last choice. The incentive to avoid repurchases to maintain debt 
capacity disappears, and the asymmetric information problems that are the focus of 
the pecking order are not the sole or perhaps even an important determinant of 
capital structures. They also raised the situation that exchanges of stock in mergers 
often have tax benefits that can offset transaction costs and any asymmetric   
information problems and stock issued to employees may have motivation benefits 
that outweigh issuing costs. In this way, the financial process is still from internal 
funds to external funds, but the equity may not be the last choice. 
 
While the Pecking Order Theory appears to be better than the Trade-off Theory, 
models are still be needed to test it. Baskin (1989) finds in the case of the USA, that 
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a firm’s debt level has a positive relationship with its past growth rate and a negative 
relationship with its profitability. This has the same prediction with the Pecking 
Order Theory. The finding of Allen (1993) indicates that firms’ debt ratios are 
negatively related to their profitability thus supporting the Pecking Order Theory. 
Tong and Green (2005) use the Chinese market find that a firm’s debt level is 
positively related to its dividend and negatively related to its profitability. Aggarwal 
and Zong (2006) find firms’ internal cash flows and their investment level can move 
in a same direction, which is consistent with the Pecking Order Theory. In this way, 
we can be sure of that the Pecking Order Theory has a stronger explanatory power 
than the Trade-off Theory. 
 
2.4 Effect of Credit Supply on Firms’ Capital Structure 
 
Both the theories considered so far only consider the demand part, but not the supply 
factors, and they make the assumption that the credit supply is elastic. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) point out that if a bank tries to attract the customers of its competitors 
by offering a lower interest rate, it will find that its offer is countered by an equally 
low interest rate when the customer being competed for is a good credit risk, and will 
not be matched if the borrower is not a profitable customer of the bank.  
 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) measure leverage using market debt ratios. They 
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found that the firms with a debt rating have a debt ratio that is higher b y almost 10.5 
percentage points. These firms’ average debt ratio is 28.4 percent, versus 17.9 
percent for the sample of firms without a rating. Firms with public debt have higher 
leverage than the firms without public debt, and this increases the firm’s debt by 59 
percent. Because of these they find that firms with access have significantly greater 
leverage. 
 
These two papers link the supply factor with the capital structure, but further study is 
still needed since we need to test whether the Trade-off Theory and the Pecking 













Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction to Research Design 
 
In order to test the whether the Trade-off Theory and Pecking Order Theory can 
better explain the firms’ capital structure with access to the capital market than the 
firms without access as covered in the earlier chapters, we will take the supply factor 
into account. We can develop three hypotheses and run tests on their efficacy. 
 
3.2 Sampling Design 
 
In order to test the assumption of this paper, the data from the American market, the 
largest market in the world were obtained from the data base of COMPUSTAT with 
and it is classified with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The tested period 
is from 2000 to 2006. From the Rajan and Zingales (1995) study, this paper will 
exclude the data from the financial institutions since their conclusion is that the 
leverage ratios for financial institutions will be higher than those of non-financial 
firms. In addition, the data from the public and utility sectors will not be taken into 
account because of their business model, leverage ratios will be high. Finally, this 




3.3 Measurement Procedure 
 
The supply factor will be tested using the Trade-off and Pecking Order theories. 
 
3.3.1 Supply Factor and Firms’ Leverage 
 
In order to obtain the relationship between the supply factors and firm’s leverage we 
need to develop the hypotheses. These are given below: 
 
H0: Supply factor has no impact on firms’ leverage.  
H1: Supply factor has a positive impact on firms’ leverage. 
 
From the literature review of Chapter 2, the assumption is that the H0 will be rejected, 
since it is expected that the supply factor of access to the debt market will have a 
positive relationship with the firm’s financial leverage. 
 
The model that will be employed to test this relationship is one developed by 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and referenced in Chapter 1 as Equation 1.1. 
Q observed = γd X demand factor +γs X supply factor + μ 
             = γd X demand factor +γs Bond market access+ μ             ……1.1 
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where Q observed is the firm’s leverage ratio (L), which is the total debt divided by total 
assets. X demand factor are the demand factors of the company, which consist of current 
ratio (CUR), intangible assets of total assets (INT), property, plant, and equipment of 
total assets (PPE), tax burden (TAX), operating profit margin (PRO) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB). 
Bond market access will equal 1 if the firm has the access of the debt market and it 
will equal 0 if it has no access of the debt market. These data can be found from the 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P). 
μ is the error term. 
From the explanation above the new function can be expressed as: 
L mn= β0 + β1 CUR mn + β2 INTmn + β3 PPEmn + β4 TAXmn 
            + β5PROmn+β6 MTB + β7 Bond market access +μmn            ……3.1 
 
3.3.2 Supply Factor and Trade-off Theory 
 
The second hypothesis is between the supply factor and the trade-off theory. 
 
H0: Supply factor has no impact on the test of the trade-off theory  




Since firms without the access of the bond market cannot get to the optimal point of 
the leverage level, in this way, the factor of access to the bond market can help to 
explain the trade-off factor in a much better way. In order to prove this assumption 
this paper will employ a model to Equation 3.2. 
 
CS mn= β0 + β1 CUR mn + β2 INTmn + β3 PPEmn + β4 TAXmn 
                       + β5PROmn+β6 MTB +μmn                          ……3.2 
In this model the CS is a measure of the leverage ratio with the other variables 
having the same meaning as in Equation 1.1. 
 
After test of Equation 1.2 which referenced in Chapter 1, the Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers’s (1999) model will be used. 
                   ΔLmn =β0 +β1 ( L*mn — Lmn-1) +μmn                   ……1.2 
If the trade-off model works in the American market, the β0 will be equal to zero and 
the β1 will be larger than zero and smaller than one. This means that the leverage 
level moves towards the target. 
 
CS mn= β0 + β1 CUR mn + β2 INTmn + β3 PPEmn + β4 TAXmn 
             + β5PROmn+β6 MTB + β7 Bond market access +μmn          ……3.3 
 




The expected result is that γ0 is equal to zero and γ1 is larger than zero and smaller 
than one. What is more, if the supply factor can help to better explain the trade-off 
theory then γ1 will be larger than β1. This means the H0 will be rejected. 
 
3.3.3 Supply Factor and Pecking Order Theory 
 
Our hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0: Supply factor has no impact on the test of the Pecking Order Theory 
H1: Supply factor has a positive impact on the test of the Pecking Order Theory 
 
From the literature review, firms with access of the debt market can enter it easier 
than the firms without. This means the supply factor can help to better explain the 
Pecking Order Theory, so the H0 should be rejected. 
 
Two steps will be followed to test whether the supply factor can help to better 
explain this theory or not. The first one is to test whether it holds in the American 
market or not, so the following model will be used: 
 




where ΔEmn is the change in equity from year n to the year n+1 when others have the  
same meaning as above. If the Pecking Order Model holds, then β1=1 and β0=0. 
 
The second step is to process to test the Pecking Order Theory in Equation 3.5. 
 
ΔLmn =β0 +β1 (ΔLmn +ΔEmn) +γ2(ΔLmn +ΔEmn) Bond market access+μmn      ……3.5 
 
If the Pecking Order Theory is validated the sum of β1 and γ2 will be larger than the 
β1, and β0 should be equal to zero. 
 
3.4 Data Collection Procedures 
 
With the benefit of previous studies (see Chapter 2), this paper will use the following 
determinants to test whether the supply factor can better explain the firms’ capital or 
not: liquidity, intangibility, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, profitability, growth 
opportunity and credit rating. Among these determinants, the credit rating is used to 







Chapter 4: Results 
 
Table 4.1 Statistical summary of Variables (2000-2006) 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
L(CS) 1813 0.197 0.183 0 0.533 
CUR 1813 2.625 2.468 0.536 10.193 
INT 1813 0.097 0.125 0 0.398 
PPE 1813 0.309 0.235 0.027 0.808 
TAX 1813 0.255 0.158 -0.082 0.433 
PRO 1813 0.047 0.235 -0.737 0.287 
MTB 1813 1.429 1.261 0.207 4.868 
ΔLmn 1813 0.004 0.043 -0.082 0.110 
ΔLmn +ΔEmn 1813 0.017 0.087 -0.120 0.278 
L*mn 1813 0.198 0.131 -0.251 0.413 
L#mn 1813 0.198 0.140 -0.227 0.437 
L*mn—Lmn-1 1813 -0.006 0.116 -0.248 0.188 
L#mn—Lmn-1 1813 -0.005 0.110 -0.244 0.160 
 
We can conclude from the Table 4.1 that most firms do not have really high leverage. 
The intangible assets do not take a large part of the total assets while the INT is 
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smaller than PPE. The PRO has a positive but not very large mean indicating that 
most companies are not highly profitable. In addition, the financing deficit and the 
change of debt are really small indicating that the firms have stable capital structures. 
Furthermore, the leverage ratio L*mn and L
#
mn is also low, indicating that these firms 
do not have high leverage ratios in these years. All the above implies that these firms 




Table 4.2 Mean of Firms’ Characteristics (2000-2006) 
 
 Rated Obs. Non-rated Obs. Mean Difference 
L(CS) 0.323 738 0.115 1075 0.208 
CUR 1.256 738 3.564 1075 -2.308 
INT 0.131 738 0.073 1075 0.058 
PPE 0.421 738 0.232 1075 0.189 
TAX 0.297 738 0.225 1075 0.072 
PRO 0.131 738 -0.019 1075 0.148 
MTB 1.691 738 1.048 1075 -0.643 
ΔLmn 0.006 738 0.003 1075 0.003 
ΔLmn +ΔEmn 0.002 738 0.025 1075 -0.023 
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L*mn 0.286 738 0.134 1075 0.152 
L#mn 0.322 738 0.114 1075 0.208 
L*mn—Lmn-1 -0.043 738 0.012 1075 -0.061 
L#mn—Lmn-1 -0.010 738 -0.002 1075 -0.008 
 
From the Table 4.2, it can that easily concluded that the credit rated firms get higher 
leverage than the firms’ do not. In this way the first hypothesis has been proved. 
Furthermore, the firms with credit rating have lower CUR, more INT, higher TAX 
and higher PRO. All these data prove that the rated firms need more deb t than the 
unrated firms, so the firms characteristics are really important to test the impact 
factors of the firms’ capital structure. 
 
Table 4.3 Supply Factor on Firms’ Leverage (2000-2006) 
 
 Coefficient p-value 
CUR -0.023 0.00*** 
INT 0.146 0.00*** 
PPE 0.223 0.00*** 
TAX -0.042 0.04** 
PRO -0.043 0.00*** 
MTB 0.035 0.00*** 
RATE 0.089 0.00*** 
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CONS 0.202 0.00*** 
Adj. R-square 0.5825  
F-test 362.38 0.00*** 
Observations 1813  
 
From the Table 4.3, it is clear that the coefficient of RATE is larger than zero while 
it’s p-value is smaller than the 1% significant level. This means if the firms have 
been rated their leverage ratio will increase. In addition, the negative sign of the 
CUR’s coefficient means that the assumption of the Pecking Order Theory is correct. 
 
The positive sign and small p-value of the coefficient of INT and PPE indicate that 
the firm’s capital structure can be explained both by the Trade-off Theory and 
Pecking Order Theory. Furthermore, the negative coefficient and small p-value of 
TAX means that the tax burden is consistent with the Pecking Order Theory. 
Meanwhile, the data of MTB also indicate this.  
 
Therefore, from the above explanation the Pecking Order Theory is holds in this 
period while the Trade-off Theory is rejected. 
 
Table 4.4 Supply Factor and Trade-off Theory (2000-2006) 
 
 Without Credit Rating With Credit Rating 
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 Coef p-value Coef p-value 
CONS 0.004 0.00*** 0.004 0.00*** 
Lmn-Lmn-1 0.036 0.00*** 0.038 0.00*** 
Adj. R-squire 0.0088  0.0092  
F-test 17.00 0.00*** 17.87 0.00*** 
Observations 1813  1813  
 
 
From Table 4.4, the constants are different from zero but close to zero in both models, 
which prove the hypothesis of the Trade-off Model. The small adjusted R-square 
shows the low explanatory power of the Trade-off Theory. In this way, the supply 
factor has some effect on firms’ capital structure, but it is really small. 
 
Table 4.5 Supply Factor and the Pecking order Theory (2000-2006) 
 
 Without Credit Rating With Credit Rating 
 Coef p-value Coef p-value 
CONS -0.001 0.03** 0.005 0.07* 
ΔLmn+ΔEmn 0.435 0.00*** 0.289 0.00*** 
Bond market 
access 
  0.007 0.00*** 




Adj. R-square 0.3502  0.4241  
F-test 2.18 0.00*** 1.86 0.00*** 
Observations 1813  1813  
 
From the results in Table 4.5, the positive intercept is consistent with assumptions, 
but the small coefficient of ΔLmn+ΔEmn indicate that the Pecking Order Theory does 
not hold in the U.S. market during this period. What more, the small adjusted 
















Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has tested two theories of capital structure: the Trade-off Theory and the 
Pecking Order Theory in the U.S. market during 2000-2006. The study applied and 
extended the study of Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s (1999) to take the credit rating into 
account as a standard to access of public debt market. At first, this paper tested the 
relationship between credit rating and firms’ leverage, As expected, the results 
showed that firms with a credit rating had a higher leverage than firms without, 
which is a similar result to the previous literature. However, when testing the 
Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory, this paper did not present the 
expected results.  
 
Although both theories did not perform well, the Pecking Order Theory provides a 
better explanation power. Finally, after the credit rating variable was added into the 
model, the results of the Pecking Order Theory were improved, suggesting greater 
confidence in this model with the supply factor. However, the improvement of the 
Trade-off theory with the supply factor concerned is not significant.  
 
Therefore as a conclusion, the Pecking Order Theory can better explain the capital 
structure in firms with access to the public debt market, while the Trade-off Theory 
cannot. In other words, the supply factor has a significant positive effect on the 
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explanatory power of the Pecking Order Theory, but little effect on the explanatory 
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